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 Introduction 
The certification of aircraft systems has traditionally been founded 
on a risk-based approach that balances the severity of the hazards caused 
by a system failure against the probability of their occurrence. While this 
approach works well for essential aircraft functions, such as airspeed or 
altitude indications, it can hamper the adoption of new safety systems. 
This is because the benefits of such systems are not generally accounted 
for in the certification process, which is only concerned with the potential 
hazards and failure probabilities arising from their incorporation. 
This paper proposes the application of Signal Detection Theory 
(SDT) concepts to optimize the risk/benefit ratio for the certification of 
optional equipment that is intended to enhance aviation safety and/or 
operational effectiveness. In many cases, the proposed method would 
lower the certification barriers for the deployment of such systems, 
leading to potentially significant aviation safety benefits, as exemplified 
by the introduction of airbags into automobiles. 
Air bags were available as optional equipment for passenger cars 
beginning in the early 1970s, but their installation remained optional until 
the passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 
1991, which made them mandatory for the front seat occupants of all 
passenger automobiles and light trucks. Although it was quickly 
recognized that airbags could convey significant safety benefits, they also 
carried two major risks: unwarranted deployment, and serious injury or 
death to vehicle occupants of small stature, such as children. The decision 
to mandate airbag fitment resulted from their overwhelming benefits, 
despite these potential drawbacks. Unfortunately, aircraft certification 
regulations do not use the risk-benefit analysis that led to the widespread 
adoption of life-saving air bags in automobiles.  
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 
23.1309-E provides guidance for the system safety analysis and 
assessment for Part 23 airplanes. The decision tree incorporated in the 
guidance addresses adverse effects, failures, malfunctions and hazards, but 
makes no mention of benefits (FAA, 2011, p. 17). Similarly, Figure 2 of 
the FAA document defines the “relationship among airplane classes, 
probabilities, severity of failure conditions, and software and complex 
hardware and Design Assurance Level” (FAA, 2011, p. 23), but no 
mention is made of the potential benefits, or their likelihood, of the system 
being installed. This same risk-based philosophy is carried over to other 
important advisory material, including the guidance for software 
certification (RTCA, 2012), complex hardware (RTCA, 2000) and system 
safety analysis (SAE, 2010). 
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 The following material develops the mathematical basis for the 
application of SDT and Bayesian methods to the certification of optional 
aircraft systems. The discussion begins with a review of SDT principles, 
which are then mapped to their counterparts in the certification domain. 
The concepts of cost and efficiency are then applied to optimize the 
risk/benefit ratio for the system under investigation. The discussion 
concludes with a case study of the method’s application to an Electronic 
Flight Bag (EFB) software application. 
Signal Detection Theory Basics 
Signal Detection Theory was initially formulated by Peterson, 
Birdsall, and Fox (1954) and extended by Tanner and Swets (1954) and 
Green and Swets (1966). Abdi (2009) extended SDT beyond the literal 
interpretation of physical parameters into the domains of abstract or 
metaphorical signals, which is pertinent to the current context. An early 
applications of Signal Detection Theory was to model human operator 
performance during target detection tasks on early radar displays. These 
devices suffered high levels of noise in relation to the relatively weak 
signal strength of the target, making the detection task difficult and 
probabilistic. In such situations, the radar operator and the radar each can 
have two states, resulting in four possible SDT system combinations: 
1. A target is present on the display (a Signal), and it is detected 
by the operator – a Hit  
2. A target is present, and is not detected – a Miss  
3. No target is present, but one is detected (i.e. noise is mistaken 
for the target) – a False Alarm (FA) 
4. No target is present, and none is detected – a Correct Rejection 
(CR) 
In the following discussion, the meanings of Hit, Miss, FA, and 
CR are to be interpreted in the SDT context. The Hit and CR states 
represent the ideal operation of the system, and they may have associate 
benefits. Conversely, misses and FAs are undesirable, and each has an 
associated cost. For example, the result of a Miss could be the destruction 
of one’s vessel by a hostile party. Equally, an FA could result in the 
destruction of an innocent (non-target) party by our weapon system.  
The final variable is the Decision Criterion adopted by the 
operator, which defines the operator’s Response Bias. The response bias of 
a risky operator results in more detected signals, leading to greater 
numbers of hits and accompanying FAs. Conversely, a conservative 
operator would incur more Misses but fewer FAs. A hypothetical unbiased 
ideal operator sets the decision criterion in an optimum manner to 
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 minimize undesirable Misses and FAs. Any deviation from the ideal 
threshold represents a conservative or liberal bias. 
The Response Bias adopted by the operator is also affected by the 
likelihood of a signal being observed, as well as by the costs and benefits 
of acting on a perceived signal. For example, if the likelihood of a signal 
and the cost of a Miss are both high (e.g. an incoming missile is both 
likely and catastrophic), then the operator would be very likely to perceive 
every stimulus as a target. On the other hand, if the cost of an FA were 
high (e.g. downing a civilian airliner), and the target probability extremely 
low (e.g. in peacetime), the operator would be unlikely to respond unless 
the target signal was overpowering. 
The importance of SDT is that it allows an exact calculation of the 
optimum Response Bias, given known likelihoods of observing a signal, 
and with defined costs and benefits (Wickens, 1992, p. 29). This is a 
striking conclusion that forms the link between SDT and the aeronautical 
certification domain, with its highly probabilistic foundations. 
SDT Definitions 
At any given moment, time t, the signal can have one of two states: 
Condition C0 – the signal is absent; 
Condition C1 – a signal is present. 
The system produces output data, x(t), corresponding to the signal 
state. The operator will act on this data to make one of the following 
decisions or judgments: 
Decision D0 – the signal is absent; 
Decision D1 – a signal is present. 
Accordingly, SDT yields four possible system states, defined as follows: 
D1C1 – Hit; 
D0C1 – Miss; 
D1C0 – False Alarm; and 
D0C0 – Correct Rejection. 
Let: 
 P(C0) be the a-priori probability of event C0 and 
P(C1) be the a-priori probability of event C1, then: 
Events C1 and C0 are complementary, so P(C0) = 1 - P(C1). 
In practice, the absolute probabilities P(D1C1), P(D0C1), P(D1C0), 
and P(D0C0) are usually unknown, so conditional probabilities are 
substituted for the four system states identified above: 
PH = P(D1|C1) is the Hit probability,  
which is the conditional probability of D1, given that C1 has occurred. 
Similarly: 
PM = P(D0|C1) is the Miss probability. 
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 PM = 1 - PH, because these are the only two possible outcomes, 
given the presence of a signal. 
 
Also: 
PFA = P(D1|C0) is the FA probability; 
PCR = P(D0|C0) is the CR probability. 
Again, PCR = 1 – PFA, because these are the only two possible 
outcomes, given the absence of a signal. 
SDT Costs 
In SDT, there are two possible failure outcomes: Miss and False 
Alarm. These generally have different negative consequences, depending 
on the real-world situation. For this reason, SDT introduces two 
corresponding relational error costs: 
c01 – Miss Cost; 
c10 – FA Cost. 
SDT Average Risk 
Combining these concepts, SDT characterizes the average risk 
value of the system as: 
 
R = c01PMP(C1) + c10PFAP(C0) (1) 
If all the values in (1) are known, the Bayes Criterion of Minimum 
Average Risk R (R → min) yields an Optimal Detection Criterion that will 
maximize the system’s Hits and minimize the False Alarms (Van Trees, 
2001). Note that the optimum performance of the system does not 
eliminate Misses and FAs, because of the probabilistic nature of the 
system, but the Bayes Criterion does provide the optimum theoretical 
system performance. The only drawback of the Bayes approach is that the 
variables in (1) are not usually known. Nevertheless, the equation can be 
used as a starting point for the application of SDT for certification 
purposes. Before making this transition, it is necessary to examine the 
probabilistic underpinnings of current certification approaches. 
Failure Conditions, Failures and Errors 
Aeronautical Circular 23.1309-E (FAA, 2011) defines the 
following terms: 
Error 
 An omission or incorrect action by a crewmember or maintenance 
personnel, or a mistake in requirements, design, or implementation. 
Failure  
An occurrence that affects the operation of a component, part, or 
element such that it can no longer function as intended (this includes both 
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 loss of function and malfunction). Note: Errors may cause failures but are 
not considered failures. 
Failure Condition 
A condition having an effect on either the airplane or its occupants, 
or both, either direct or consequential, which is caused or contributed to by 
one or more failures or errors considering flight phase and relevant 
adverse operational or environmental conditions or external events. Figure 
2 of 23.1309-E (FAA, 2011, p. 23) places maximum bounds for different 
Failure Condition severity levels as follows: 
P(FCi) < Mi, i = 1, …, 4 (2)  
where: 
FC1 is a Minor Failure Conditions, 
FC2 is a Major Failure Conditions, 
FC3 is a Hazardous Failure Conditions, 
FC4 is a Catastrophic Failure Conditions, and 
Mi are the Maximum acceptable values corresponding to each 
Failure Condition severity level. 
AC 23.1309-E states: 
The probability of a failure condition occurring on an "average 
flight" should be determined by structured methods (see ARP 4761 
for various methods) and should consider all elements (e.g., 
combinations of failures and events) that contribute to a failure 
condition. If there is only an effect when failures occur in a certain 
order, the calculation should account for the conditional 
probability that the failures occur in the sequence necessary to 
produce a failure condition (FAA, 2011, p. A3–1). 
In particular, if a Failure Condition may be caused by 1 of n 
mutually exclusive failures F1, …, Fn, then: 
P(FC) = P(FC|F1)P(F1) + … + P(FC|Fn)P(Fn) (3) 
 
This is the certification equivalent of SDT equation (1) above. In 
the context of an information system, (2) does not differentiate between 
the different costs associated with Loss-of-Function failures (Misses) from 
Hazardously Misleading ones (False Alarms). Equation (3) also takes no 
account of the potential benefits of the optional system, as there are no 
benefits terms in the equation. Accordingly, an optional safety system, of 
the type being addressed by this paper, might be deemed uncertifiable, 
despite overwhelming potential benefits. This shortcoming can be 
addressed by mapping the SDT approach to the certification domain. 
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 Mapping SDT and Aircraft Certification Terms 
The SDT concepts of Signals, Hits, Misses, FAs, CRs, and System 
Average Risk can be applied to optional aircraft safety systems, whereby a 
Signal is viewed as a pilot error, and a Hit is viewed as a Save by the 
safety system in question. Using this approach, the SDT definitions can be 
mapped to the certification environment as follows: 
Signal represents an unaided pilot error when the safety system is 
not installed that can cause an accident (i.e. UPE - an unaided pilot error). 
An optional safety system is therefore analogous to a Signal Detection 
System in SDT. The associated Signal probability is denoted by PUPE. 
Hit denotes a “save” by a correctly functioning safety system, 
which prevents the pilot from making an error that would otherwise have 
been committed. An SDT Hit maps to a certification Save, with a 
probability of PSave. 
Miss denotes a safety system’s failure to prevent an error under 
UPE conditions. Let’s denote Miss by NSave (No Save) and the Miss 
probability by PNSave. 
Correct Rejection reflects the correct operation of the system in 
the absence of any pilot error. 
False Alarm represents a safety system failure that results in 
Hazardously Misleading (HM) data being presented, in the absence of a 
UPE. The equivalent False Alarm probability is PHM. 
Miss Cost denotes the conditional probability of a Failure 
Condition of a specified severity level arising as a result of a safety 
system’s failure to Save P(FC|NSave). This parameter broadly 
characterizes the severity of the consequences of the safety system’s 
failure. 
False Alarm Cost denotes the conditional probability of a Failure 
Condition of a specified severity level arising as a result of a safety 
system’s issuing a False Alarm (or Hazardously Misleading Information) 
P(FC|HM). This parameter captures the severity of the consequences of 
the safety system’s issuing a false alarm. 
Applying these mappings of SDT terms, the Average System Risk 
from (1) can be rewritten as: 
R = P(FC|NSave)PNSavePUPE + P(FC|HM)PHM(1 - PUPE)          (4) 
Any possible failure in SDT can be categorized either as a Miss 
(NSave) or a False Alarm (HM), which are mutually exclusive, so, 
according to (3), the R in (4) is analogous to P(FCi) in the Certification 
Requirement (2) above. 
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 The System Efficiency Concept 
In (4) above, R is the risk of a Failure Condition when the system 
is present. We now define Rw as the risk of the same Failure Condition 
without the optional system. It follows that the system is effective if the 
overall risk with the system is lower than the risk without the system 
installed: 
R < Rw (5) 
This is the key formula for determining any safety system efficiency.  
The percentage efficiency of a safety system can be considered as: 
Eff(%)= 100(Rw – R)/Rw (6) 
Let Pw(FC|UPE) be the conditional probability of specified Failure 
Condition without the system, under a given UPE condition. The overall 
risk of the specified Failure Conditions is therefore: 
Rw = Pw(FC|UPE)PUPE (7) 
Using (4) and (7), we can rewrite the efficiency requirement (5) as: 
P(FC|NSave)PNSavePUPE + P(FC|HM)PHM(1 - PUPE) < 
Pw(FC|UPE)PUPE (8) 
NSave represents a failure event under a given UPE condition. 
This is no different than the situation where a pilot has made an error 
without the system installed, so P(FC|NSave) = Pw(FC|UPE), and (8) can 
be rewritten as  
Pw(FC|UPE)PNSavePUPE + P(FC|HM)PHM(1–PUPE) < 
Pw(FC|UPE)PUPE 
Rearranging:  
P(FC|HM)PHM(1 – PUPE) < Pw(FC|UPE)PUPE(1 – PNSave) 
By definition: (1 – PNSave) = PSave giving our final requirement: 
 
P(FC|HM)PHM(1–PUPE) < Pw(FC|UPE)PUPEPSave (9) 
This formula quantitatively defines the threshold criterion at which 
the optional safety system statistically breaks even with the baseline 
unmodified aircraft, taking into account both the risks and the potential 
benefits of the system. The application of the preceding criterion is best 
illustrated using a case study. 
Case Study 
The following example pertains to the presentation of an aircraft 
position spotter during flight on an EFB-hosted electronic chart, which is 
currently prohibited unless an “…installed primary flight display, weather 
display, or map display also depict(s) own-ship position” (FAA, 2017, p. 
15). 
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 The use of a spotter undoubtedly confers some operational and 
safety benefits, but at the risk of misleading the crew if a software failure 
leads to a hazardously misleading (HM) condition. This could arise if the 
spotter is shown in the wrong position or orientation. The situation would 
result in a failure condition if the pilot(s) follow the bad data, Air Traffic 
Control doesn’t catch the error, etc. These probabilities can be estimated 
and applied to (9) to quantitatively determine if the spotter confers a 
positive safety benefit. To do so, we introduce the following events for 
illustrative purposes only: 
ErrSw - an untrapped software error has caused a hazardously 
misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. 
no UPE); 
ErrGPS - incorrect GPS or navigation input to the spotter has 
caused a hazardously misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a 
prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE); 
ErrDB - a chart database error has caused a hazardously 
misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. 
no UPE); 
Nr - “Not recognized”: the crew fail to recognize the HM that the 
aircraft is not at the displayed position; 
E1 - the HM information is in a dangerous sense (e.g. the error 
biases the crew towards an occupied runway, rather than away from it); 
E2 - the crew follows the HM information, despite other visual or 
navigation cues; 
E3 - Air Traffic Control fails to detect the hazardous maneuver; 
and 
E4 - the crew action actually causes an accident (e.g. collision with 
terrain, obstacles, or another aircraft). 
Using the definitions above, the combined probability of 
Hazardously Misleading Information from the three identified causes is: 
PHM = 1 – (1–PErrSw)(1–PErrGPS)(1–PErrDB) (10) 
Nr, E1, E2, E3, and E4 are the necessary events following HM that 
will lead to a Failure Condition, so: 
P(FC|HM) = P(E4E3E2E1|NrHM)P(Nr|HM) (11) 
Once the crew has failed to recognize a hazardously misleading 
spotter event, the probability of the subsequent events (E1-E4) leading to a 
Failure Condition are identical, whether the system is present or not. For 
example: ATC is no more or less likely to detect a deviation caused by an 
HM-induced spotter-error than one caused by an unaided pilot error 
without the system installed. Similarly, the likelihood of a random unaided 
pilot error (UPE) being in a dangerous sense is identical to the probability 
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 that a random HM software error is also in a dangerous sense. For 
example: random software and pilot errors would be expected to have 
equal probabilities of biasing the crew towards, or away from, an occupied 
runway. Summarizing this concept: 
P(E4E3E2E1|NrHM) = Pw(FC|UPE) (12) 
Using (11) and (12), the system efficiency criterion (9) can be 
rewritten as: 
Pw(FC|UPE)P(Nr|HM)PHM(1–PUPE) < Pw(FC|UPE)PUPEPSave 
Simplifying: 
P(Nr|HM)PHM(1–PUPE) < PUPEPSave (13) 
This formula makes an interesting contrast with the standard 
certification requirement we saw in (2): P(FCi) < Mi, i = 1, …, 4. 
For the electronic chart spotter, formulas (10) and (13) can be 
combined to calculate the maximum acceptable probability of an 
untrapped software error leading to an HM event: 
1–(1–PErrSw)(1–PErrGPS)(1–PErrDB) < PSavePUPE/(P(Nr|HM)(1–PUPE)) (14) 
Formula (14) yields a quantified measure of the required system 
reliability. The final step in the analysis is to examine the variation of the 
maximum allowable probability of a Hazardously Misleading software 
error PErrSw. This is best visualized graphically, and requires the 
introduction of three final constructs. 
PSave and P(Nr|HM) in (14) are difficult to calculate with absolute 
accuracy, but a solution can be derived by revisiting the automobile airbag 
example used in the introduction. It is doubtful that accurate figures could 
be derived for airbag “saves” and for “losses” caused by malfunctioning 
airbags. Nevertheless, the order of magnitude of the save ratio can be 
estimated. The same analogy applies to the un-quantified probabilities 
above: the order of magnitude of the ratio PSave/P(Nr|HM) can be 
estimated, with sufficient accuracy for this analysis. This ratio is used as 
abscissa for the required system reliability plot. 
Similarly, the effect of a wide range of PUPE values should be 
examined in order to determine the system sensitivity to the probability of 
Unaided Pilot Errors. For this reason, (14) is used to produce a family of 
curves for varying PUPE values. These have been bounded within a range 
of range 10-2 -10-4 because the former would represent many thousands of 
errors every day, when viewed across all flight operations worldwide. 
Conversely, the latter would imply that a representative 20,000-hour pilot 
has only made one such error in his or her career, based on an average 
stage-length of two hours. 
The last assumption relates to the values for PErrGPS and PErrDB. 
These are effectively the probabilities of a hazardously misleading GPS 
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 position (independent of the EFB and its software), and of a hazardous 
chart database error. These probabilities can be derived in a number of 
ways, including service history and FOQA data reviews, but for the 
purpose of the case study, they are arbitrarily assigned the following 
values: 
PErrGPS = 10
-6 
PErrDB = 10
-5 
Figure 1 illustrates the result of applying the preceding 
assumptions to (14). The y-axis (max. acceptable PErrSw) has a logarithmic 
scale with the inverse order of values. 
 
 
Figure 1. Minimum Acceptable Software Reliability as a Function of 
System Benefit/ Risk Analysis. 
 
The following example illustrate the practical application of Figure 
1. Assuming that the pilot’s probability of making an unaided error is 10-3, 
and that the system saves 25 times as often as it hazardously misleads, 
then the required system reliability to achieve a net beneficial effect is 
approximately 2.5 x 10-2. This corresponds to DO-178C Level D software 
(RTCA, 2012), which is achievable by Commercial-Off-The Shelf 
(COTS) products and applications. If this performance requirement is 
exceeded, the optional system would yield a positive safety improvement 
over the baseline, even though the assumed reliability is several orders of 
magnitude below that required for navigation systems. 
Figure 1 also shows that the software reliability must be increased 
(i.e. the failure rate must decrease), when either of the following occurs: 
1. The pilot becomes more reliable; and/or 
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 2. The system Save/Unrecognized Hazard ratio decreases. 
Conclusions 
Signal Detection Theory and Bayesian optimization methods can 
be applied to the certification of optional aircraft systems, and a formal 
method has been developed that allows the numerical optimization of the 
risk/benefit ratio of such systems. Using representative data from the case 
study of a spotter on an electronic chart, it has been demonstrated that 
safety benefits would be achieved, even with the software reliability levels 
typically associated with COTS software such as Windows™ which are 
significantly below the current certification standards. The method makes 
few domain assumptions, and is based on the underpinnings of SDT and 
Bayesian probability theory, with well-established validity and reliability. 
Accordingly, the technique should have broad application to the 
certification of all optional aircraft systems. 
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 Nomenclature 
ATC – Air Traffic Control 
CR – Correct Rejection 
E1 - the HM information is in a dangerous sense (e.g. the error biases the 
crew towards an occupied runway, rather than away from it) 
E2 - the crew follows the HM information, despite other visual or 
navigation cues 
E3 - Air Traffic Control fails to detect the hazardous maneuver 
E4 - the crew action actually causes an accident (e.g. collision with terrain, 
obstacles, or another aircraft) 
ErrDB - a chart database error has caused a hazardously misleading (HM) 
condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE) 
ErrGPS - incorrect GPS or navigation input to the spotter has caused a 
hazardously misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing 
pilot error (i.e. no UPE) 
ErrSw - an untrapped software error has caused a hazardously misleading 
(HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE) 
FA – False Alarm 
FAA – Federal Aviation Administration 
FC – Failure Condition 
FOQA – Flight Operations Quality Assurance 
HM – Hazardously Misleading 
Nr - “Not recognized”: the crew fail to recognize the HM that the aircraft 
is not at the displayed position 
NSave – No Save 
P – Probability 
R – Risk of a failure condition when the system is present 
Rw – Risk of the same failure condition Without the system 
RTCA - Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
SAE – Society of Automotive Engineers 
UPE - Unaided Pilot Error 
12
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 6 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol6/iss3/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2019.1349
  
References 
Abdi, H. (2009). Signal detection theory. In B. McGaw, P. L. Peterson, & 
E. Baker (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Education (3rd ed., pp. 1-10). 
New York, NY: Elsevier.  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2011). Advisory Circular 23.1309-E, 
System safety analysis and assessment for Part 23 airplanes. 
Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/ 
media/Advisory_Circular/AC_23_1309-1E.pdf  
Federal Aviation Administration. (2017). Advisory Circular 120-76D, 
Authorization for use of electronic flight bags. Retrieved from 
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/A
C_120-76D.pdf  
Green, D. M., & Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal detection theory and 
psychophysics. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Peterson, W. W., Birdsall, T. G., & Fox, W. (1954). The theory of signal 
detectability. Information Theory, Transactions of the IRE 
Professional Group On, 4(4), 171-212. 
doi:10.1109/TIT.1954.1057460 
RTCA. (2000). Design assurance guidance for airborne electronic 
hardware (DO-254). Washington, DC: RTCA, Inc. 
RTCA. (2012). Software considerations in airborne systems and 
equipment certification (DO-178C). Washington, DC: RTCA, Inc. 
SAE. (2010). ARP4754, Guidelines for development of civil aircraft and 
systems. Retrieved from www.sae.org/technical/standards/ 
arp4754a. 
Tanner, W. P., Jr., & Swets, J. A. (1954). A decision-making theory of 
visual detection. Psychological Review, 61(6), 401-409. 
doi:10.1037/h0058700  
Van Trees, H. L. (2001). Detection, estimation and modulation theory. 
New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Wickens, C. D. (1992). Engineering psychology in human performance 
(2nd ed.). New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers Inc. 
13
Maris and Ilyin: SDT methods for aircraft certification
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2019
